Like it or not, Burma’s politics will remain black and white, with no prospect of becoming “multi-colored,” as in neighboring Thailand.
The decision by Burma's main opposition party and outright winner of the 1990 election, the National League for Democracy (NLD), not to reregister signaled that political divisions remain deep.
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Aung Zaw is founder and editor of the Irrawaddy magazine. He can be reached at [email protected].
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As the NLD held a final gathering this week at its Rangoon headquarters before its forced dissolution, Burmese people and the dissident community inside and outside the country hotly debated the future of the party, the democracy movement as a whole and, of course, the roles of Aung San Suu Kyi and other party leaders.
Many pragmatists, revolutionary activists and even members of the “pro-election” camp have sympathy for the NLD and Suu Kyi and want them to continue the fight. Some of the criticism of the NLD is based on sympathy because the critics want to see the party adopt a better political strategy and tactics and to become savvy.
Since its foundation in 1988, the NLD has never been able to function as a political party, operating rather like a quasi semi-underground social movement. Many of its leaders, including Suu Kyi, have been detained for long terms of imprisonment or house arrest.
Although the NLD emerged the winner of the 1990 election, the result was not recognized by the regime, which then decapitated the party and imprisoned many of its members.
The regime ruthlessly and brutally played a black and white game, and with the dissolution now of the party the junta may feel it has achieved its objective. But I am not so sure.
Suu Kyi and party leaders have repeatedly said that they would never turn their backs on the people or renounce the struggle for democracy. They have vowed to keep the visible signs of the party—its banners and placards—on view, perhaps provoking a crackdown.
Political and social instability will undoubtedly increase before we see a better Burma.
Suu Kyi will continue to be an influential leader regardless of whether or not she remains under house arrest or heads a political movement. She and other prominent activists now in prison should be released and resume their involvement in the opposition movement.
The new government (a “wolf in sheep's clothing?”) will have no choice but to continue to face the fundamental challenges presented by a still formidable Suu Kyi and her calls for political dialogue, the embattled democracy movement, radical activists, unpredictable political strife, thorny ethnic issues and the restless, armed ethnic rebels.
International support for Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy movement, while not expected to increase dramatically, will remain strong. The struggle is not over. With or without the NLD, the desire for change in Burma will remain the same.
The upcoming election (apparently more like a selection than an election) is unlikely to change the dynamics of the current civil-military relationship because the regime wields a unilateral and coercive policy instrument. We may see a less evil and more sophisticated government take power but fundamentally meaningful changes are unlikely to come to Burma.
The issues of ethnic minorities, human rights violations, political prisoners, forced labor, internally displaced persons, refugees and the millions of migrants stranded in neighboring countries won’t be solved.
The ethnic issue will continue to confront the new government because the Burman-dominated military regime doesn’t understand the aspirations of the ethnic minorities and why they took up arms in the first place.
Snr-Gen Than Shwe once famously declared at a cabinet meeting: “Let them [the ethnic minority groups] smoke as many 555 cigarettes as possible. Let them drink as many Black Label [whiskies] as possible. As long we have peace it is fine.”
Ethnic leaders aren't fighting for 555 cigarettes and Black Label whiskey, however. Without a solution of ethnic issues, there can be no political transition in Burma.
Internationally, the military’s absolute control of key areas in the future government indicates that Naypyidaw will remain a pariah, lacking credibility and legitimacy. Burma will continue to be a problem child in the region and beyond.
Sanctions will remain in place, although the West, particularly the US, will find more creative ways to penetrate Burma and the new regime.
The clandestine military relationship between Burma and North Korea will continue to draw the attention of the West and neighboring governments.
Of course, there is no lack of wishful thinkers and spin-doctors, saying things they don’t believe in for the sake of maintaining the status quo for their donors or just to undermine Suu Kyi and the democracy movement.
Indeed, some naively believe there will be a new landscape after the election. Any new landscape, however, will be just a facade—even Snr-Gen Than Shwe's change from military uniform to civilian suit won't disguise his true clown's costume.
Than Shwe and his team should not be underestimated, however. They have a raft of “Plan Bs” in order to hold on to power at all cost. They don't care how many more activists die in prison or in ethnic conflicts. They are unmoved by the plight of refugees and internally displaced people.
Than Shwe and his road map may deceive sections of the foreign community and some regional leaders suffering from “Burma fatigue.” But the people of Burma are not deceived—they've had enough of the hell that is Burma today and they want change.
